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New regionalism: how Ukraine's regional policy should develop through the prism of European integration

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Objective. To substantiate the conceptual foundations of a new regionalism for Ukraine in the context of war, postwar reconstruction, and European integration, and to develop an institutional and financial model for the transition from a predominantly redistributive budget equalization policy to a territory-oriented development policy compatible with the principles of EU cohesion policy.

Methodology. Systemic, institutional, and comparative approaches were applied, along with the case study method to analyze the experiences of Poland, Romania, and Croatia. The information base consists of EU and Ukrainian legislation, materials from the European Commission and RDNA5, documents from the Ukraine Facility, and scholarly works on place-based development, Cohesion Policy, and smart specialization.

Results. The paper justifies the need to transition from a policy of resource allocation among administrative units to the development of functional territories, taking into account their potential, security risks, demographic changes, and institutional capacity. A model of the "5Ps of New Regionalism" is proposed: space, potential, partnership, powers, and cohesion policy. The directions for its implementation are identified: the formation of a national territorial typology; the introduction of multi-year regional programs; the professionalization of regional development agencies; the combination of grants, loans, and guarantees; the development of smart specialization; and the transition from evaluating the absorption of funds to a system of economic, socio-demographic, and institutional outcomes.

Originality. A place-based approach has been developed by adapting it to Ukraine's security-asymmetric economy, in which territorial disparities are determined not only by productivity and the quality of institutions but also by risks of asset destruction, forced migration, and the transformation of logistical links. The principle of asymmetric decentralization is substantiated, according to which the scope of delegated functions depends on the proven institutional capacity of regional structures.

Practical Value. The proposed approach can be used to formulate Ukraine's State Strategy for Regional Development for 2028-2034, to develop territorially differentiated recovery programs, and to prepare Ukraine's institutional system for the implementation of the requirements of Chapter 22 of the EU acquis.

Keywords: regional policy, new regionalism, EU cohesion policy, place-based development, multilevel governance, smart specialization, Ukraine's reconstruction, European integration.

Introduction

Ukraine's regional policy is entering a period in which its traditional logic no longer corresponds to the scale and nature of the country's spatial challenges. For a long time, it was primarily a policy of fiscal equalisation, financing individual infrastructure facilities and responding to the problems of disadvantaged territories. The full-scale war has radically altered the geography of economic potential, population, production, logistics, housing stock and basic infrastructure. At the same time, European integration is moving regional policy from a peripheral area of public administration into a sphere directly linked to the future management of EU structural instruments.

In the contemporary European paradigm, regional policy is not limited to compensating for lagging development. It combines convergence with competitiveness, local strategies with national objectives, infrastructure investment with innovation policy, and financing with a clear system of performance and accountability. This is why place-based development treats a territory not as a passive recipient of

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resources, but as the bearer of specific potential, institutions, knowledge and coordination problems (Barca, McCann & Rodríguez-Pose, 2012).

For Ukraine, the issue is particularly acute. According to RDNA5, direct damage as of the end of 2025 exceeded USD 195 billion, while ten-year recovery and reconstruction needs were estimated at USD 587.7 billion; the damage is concentrated in frontline regions and major urban agglomerations (World Bank, 2026). This means that a universal “one region—one set of instruments” policy is methodologically flawed. Differences in security risks, demographic trajectories, access to EU borders, industrial structure and institutional capacity require a differentiated territorial policy.

The EU accession negotiations provide an additional impetus. Following the completion of bilateral screening in September 2025, Ukraine opened the first negotiating cluster, “Fundamentals”, in June 2026 and the “External Relations” cluster in July (European Commission, 2026a; 2026b). Chapter 22, “Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments”, will require not only legal approximation but also the establishment of a capable system for programming, management, control, audit and investment evaluation. Preparation for membership therefore effectively coincides with the need to rebuild Ukraine’s domestic model of regional policy.

Literature Review

The theoretical foundation of contemporary regional policy is formed by several interrelated strands. The first is the debate between place-neutral and place-based approaches. Barca, McCann and Rodríguez-Pose (2012) argue that economic policy must take account of the social, institutional and geographical heterogeneity of territories. Its purpose is not to entrench backwardness, but to mobilise unrealised potential by removing local institutional and coordination barriers.

The second strand concerns the role of institutional quality. Rodríguez-Pose (2013) shows that regional development cannot be explained solely by stocks of capital, human resources and infrastructure. The quality of formal and informal institutions determines a territory’s ability to convert resources into sustained growth. Rodríguez-Pose and Garcilazo (2015) empirically confirm that returns from structural and cohesion funds depend substantially on the quality of governance: beyond a certain level of expenditure, institutional improvement may be more important than an additional transfer.

The third strand examines the heterogeneity of Cohesion Policy effects. Crescenzi and Giua (2020) show that Cohesion Policy has a positive average impact, but its outcomes vary substantially across countries because of the institutional context, economic structure and programme design. This is crucial for Ukraine, where the differences among frontline, western border, capital-city, agricultural and old-industrial territories far exceed the typical interregional heterogeneity of a peacetime economy.

The fourth strand is smart specialisation. According to Foray (2015), regional innovation policy should move away from universal lists of “promising industries” and rely on the entrepreneurial discovery process—a systematic interaction among business, science, government and other actors to identify genuine capabilities and opportunities for technological diversification. For Ukraine, this is important because post-war modernisation cannot be reduced to restoring the pre-war structure of productive forces.

Despite the extensive body of international research, the question of how Ukraine can combine the place-based approach, Cohesion Policy, wartime security asymmetry,

institutional preparation for EU membership and the scale of reconstruction within a single model remains insufficiently developed. This unresolved aspect of the problem is the subject of the article.

Methodology

The study combines systems, institutional and comparative approaches. The systems approach is used to analyse regional policy as an interaction among strategic planning, the budget process, public investment, multi-level governance, innovation policy and demographic policy. The institutional approach is applied to assess the capacity of public authorities and development agencies, as well as coordination, accountability and control mechanisms.

The comparative analysis of Poland, Romania and Croatia is conducted according to five criteria: the scale and structure of financing; the distribution of competences between central and regional levels; the model of managing authorities; the use of territorially differentiated instruments; and observed or model-estimated outcomes and institutional problems. The countries were selected because of their post-socialist legacy, experience of adapting to the EU *acquis* and the significant role of cohesion funds in public investment.

The source base comprises EU legal acts, European Commission materials, official Ukrainian documents, RDNA5 data and peer-reviewed literature indexed in Scopus and Web of Science. Quantitative indicators of European programmes are used as measures of scale and institutional design, rather than as evidence of the automatic effectiveness of transfers.

Purpose of the Article

The purpose of the article is to substantiate a conceptual model of new regionalism for Ukraine and to identify the institutional and financial mechanisms required to move from a predominantly distributive regional policy to a place-based development system compatible with the principles of EU Cohesion Policy and the needs of wartime and post-war reconstruction.

1. From Equalisation Policy to Development through Territories

The principal change Ukraine requires is a rethinking of the object of policy. In the traditional model, that object is an administrative unit receiving a transfer. In the new model, it is a functional territory facing a specific development challenge. Such a territory may be an agglomeration, a border belt, a mountain area, a system of small towns, a coal basin, an industrial transition zone or a group of communities with a similar demographic profile. This approach brings public policy closer to the actual geography of economic and social interconnections.

The war has made functional differentiation even more important. A frontline community needs security instruments, backup energy supply, rapid restoration of critical services and compensation for exceptionally high investment risk. A western border region needs infrastructure for integration into the EU single market, logistics and processing. A large agglomeration needs transport mobility, housing policy and metropolitan governance. An old-industrial territory needs programmes of technological diversification and just transition. An identical grant competition for these territories does not create equality; it merely conceals their different starting conditions.

The updated State Strategy for Regional Development for 2021–2027 already partly reflects this paradigm shift by strengthening multi-level governance,

recovery and public investment management (Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 2024). The Action Plan for 2025–2027 contains 101 tasks and is directly linked to the recommendations under Chapter 22 (Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 2025). The next strategic cycle should move from individual elements of place-based policy to a systemic model.

2. The Author's “5Ps of New Regionalism” Model

To systematise the transition, the “5Ps of new regionalism” model is proposed, combining five interdependent elements: place, potential, partnership, powers and cohesion policy. Its fundamental difference from the traditional model is that financing is not the starting variable but a derived one: the territorial problem, potential, institutional responsibility and expected outcome are identified first, and only then is the financial instrument selected.

Element	Content	Practical Implication for Ukraine
Place	Functional territories are more important than formal administrative boundaries.	Introduce a national territorial typology and dedicated programme “windows”.
Potential	Policy builds on local assets, knowledge, capabilities and untapped opportunities.	Smart specialisation and regional development missions instead of universal lists of industries.
Partnership	Decisions are shaped through multi-level interaction among government, business, science and civil society.	Partnership committees for programming and monitoring; continuous centre–region–community dialogue.
Powers	Responsibility for a programme must correspond to actual administrative capacity.	Phased accreditation of regional development agencies and delegation of functions.
Cohesion Policy	Resources are combined with programming, conditionality, audit, evaluation and co-financing.	Multiannual regional programmes focused on outcomes rather than the “absorption” of funds.

The “5Ps” model makes it possible to avoid two extremes. The first is a centralised model in which regional policy is effectively reduced to decisions by central authorities on a list of facilities. The second is formal decentralisation without adequate capacity, where powers are transferred to institutions lacking the necessary staffing, financial and control systems. New regionalism entails asymmetric decentralisation: greater responsibility is assigned to regional bodies that have demonstrated their ability to manage programmes according to transparent standards.

3. European Experience: What Ukraine Should Adopt—and What It Should Not

Poland demonstrates the advantages of substantial regional programming. For 2021–2027, its Partnership Agreement covers EUR 76.5 billion in Cohesion Policy resources and 16 regional programmes (European Commission, 2022a). What matters is not only the scale, but the principle itself: a region receives a multiannual programming framework and responsibility, rather than merely the right to submit individual projects to a central competition. For Ukraine, this means moving from a “portfolio of facilities” to programmes organised around several territorial development missions.

Romania is noteworthy for the professionalisation of its development agencies. Its EUR 31.5 billion in Cohesion Policy funding for 2021–2027 is implemented, inter alia, through eight regional programmes, with regional agencies assuming the functions of managing authorities (European Commission, 2022b). This experience is particularly relevant for Ukraine because it shows that strong regional management of funds is possible without a radical overhaul of the political-territorial system. However, the delegation of powers must be accompanied by staffing standards, stable financing and internal control systems.

Croatia, which receives about EUR 9 billion in Cohesion Policy funding for 2021–2027, demonstrates the strengths of integrated strategic planning and territorial instruments, while also highlighting the risk of institutional fragmentation at too small a scale (European Commission, 2022c). For Ukraine, this means that not every specialised competence should be replicated in every region. Cost-benefit analysis for major infrastructure projects, State aid, blended finance, climate proofing and complex audits can be concentrated in shared centres of competence.

A comparison of the three countries yields a common conclusion: the Europeanisation of regional policy is, above all, the Europeanisation of institutions. Funding works better when it is embedded in a strategic cycle and supported by professional bodies, clear accountability, partnership and an evaluation system. Ukraine should therefore avoid building a recovery model in which success is measured solely by the number of projects or the share of financing used.

Country	Key Feature of the Model	Lesson for Ukraine
Poland	Sixteen regional programmes and substantial multiannual resources.	Regions should receive programme budgets and responsibility for outcomes.
Romania	Professional development agencies acting as managing authorities for regional programmes.	Functions may be delegated after capacity has been accredited.
Croatia	A hierarchy of strategic planning and territorial instruments, alongside a risk of fragmentation.	Specialised competences should be pooled in interregional or national centres.

4. Territorial Typology as the Basis of Recovery Policy

Ukraine needs a National Framework for Territorial Typology to be used not only for statistical description, but also for selecting policy instruments. At a minimum, it should distinguish frontline territories and territories bordering Russia and Belarus; de-occupied territories; metropolitan agglomerations; old-industrial transition territories; rural and demographically vulnerable peripheries; the Carpathian and mountain area; territories bordering the EU; and maritime and port hubs.

The typology should be dynamic. Security status, market accessibility, the migration situation and economic structure can change rapidly. A territory's category should therefore be reviewed on the basis of a system of indicators, rather than fixed by a political decision for decades. This would also reduce the risk of special status becoming a permanent channel for rent-seeking funding.

Each type should have its own combination of instruments. Frontline territories need a higher grant component, war-risk insurance, backup energy supply and rapid restoration of basic services. Territories bordering the EU need co-financing for logistics and cross-border investment. Old-industrial territories need just-transition instruments, reskilling and technological modernisation. Agglomerations need integrated transport, housing and spatial planning.

5. Institutional Architecture: A Strong Centre and Strong Regions

New regionalism does not imply a weaker state. On the contrary, managing large-scale European and recovery resources requires a strong centre capable of setting rules, ensuring macro-financial discipline, conducting audits and maintaining uniform standards. At the same time, the central level should not substitute for regional programming. A functional division is appropriate: the authority responsible for regional policy should develop the territorial methodology and coordinate Chapter 22; the Ministry of Economy should oversee the overall public investment system; and the Ministry of Finance should define the resource framework, budgetary discipline and financial control.

At the regional level, regional development agencies should be transformed into professional intermediate bodies for programme implementation. Their status, however, should not be granted automatically. Accreditation is required against minimum standards covering staffing and competence; internal control systems; independence of project appraisal; data management; audit; procurement; monitoring; and evaluation. Where capacity is insufficient, technical assistance—not the transfer of large budgets—should be the first instrument used.

The partnership principle should occupy a special place. Monitoring committees for regional programmes should include representatives of communities, business, universities, trade unions and civil society and, for certain territories, veterans' and internally displaced persons' organisations. Such a mechanism reduces the information asymmetry between government and the territory and transforms consultation from a formal procedure into an integral component of policymaking.

6. Financial Model: From Grant Dependence to a Mix of Instruments

The Ukraine Facility for 2024–2027 provides a transitional framework between wartime support and future development policy. The mechanism has a total volume of EUR 50 billion; Pillar I provides substantial budget support, and at least 20% of its grant funding is to be directed to regional needs (Ukraine Facility, 2024). It is important to use this resource not only to finance individual facilities, but also to test the future architecture of regional programmes.

The financial model of new regionalism should be based on matching the instrument to the economics of the project. A grant is justified where the social impact is high but there is no commercial cash flow: basic social infrastructure, restoration of critical services, and certain environmental and security investments. A loan or guarantee is appropriate where predictable revenue exists. Blended finance should be used for projects with high social returns but insufficient private profitability. This approach would preserve scarce grant resources for areas where market financing cannot replace them.

The State Fund for Regional Development, or its functional successor, should be transformed into a co-financing fund for regional programmes. Its task should not be to finance the maximum number of disconnected facilities, but to provide the national contribution to EU programmes, project preparation, technical assistance and territorial priorities for which external instruments are unavailable.

7. From “Absorbing Funds” to Measuring Outcomes

One of the most dangerous institutional legacies is the use of the percentage of funds absorbed as the principal indicator of success. Such a KPI encourages rapid spending rather than sound decisions. Under the new model, every regional programme should have a baseline, targets and an outcome framework.

The economic block of indicators should cover labour productivity, employment, private investment, export diversification, the share of processing industries and changes in gross regional product per capita. The socio-demographic block should include net migration, population return and access to basic services, housing and jobs. The institutional block should cover project preparation time, competitiveness in procurement, the number of material audit findings, the share of projects completed within budget and on schedule, and the coverage of ex-post evaluation.

The DREAM digital system can become not merely a project registry, but the core of territorial policy intelligence. It should integrate regional indicators and data on the full investment life cycle, beneficiaries, contractors, cost changes, co-financing sources and achieved outcomes. This would simultaneously improve management quality and reduce corruption risks.

8. Demographic Resilience as a Criterion of Regional Development

In Ukraine's circumstances, demography should not be a background social indicator, but one of the central criteria of territorial policy. Large-scale external and internal migration, human-capital losses, mobilisation, population ageing and the uneven return of displaced persons are changing the country's economic geography. A region may receive substantial infrastructure funding yet fail to develop if it lacks enough people for work, entrepreneurship, consumption and the continued viability of local communities. The evaluation of regional programmes should therefore include indicators of population retention and return, as well as access to housing, education, healthcare, care services and employment.

Demographic resilience does not mean an administrative attempt to "anchor" the population in every territory. In some communities, the pre-war population may be economically unattainable or unsafe over the medium term. The state should distinguish between territories where the strategic objective is population return and the restoration of population density, territories requiring managed adaptation to decline, and territories where the priority is access to basic services through intermunicipal cooperation. This framing is politically difficult but economically necessary, because infrastructure recovery must correspond to the actual future settlement pattern.

For frontline and de-occupied territories, demographic policy must be directly linked to security and the economic base. Population return cannot be secured through a one-off payment or housing reconstruction alone. Jobs, risk insurance, access to credit, high-quality schools, healthcare, transport accessibility and a credible security horizon are all required. A territorial recovery programme should therefore treat housing, employment, infrastructure and security as a single package, rather than as sets of unrelated projects administered by different ministries.

For western and central regions that have received large flows of internally displaced persons and relocated enterprises, the task is different: to turn forced migration into a long-term strengthening of human and entrepreneurial potential without placing excessive pressure on housing, transport and social services. This requires integrated urban policy, the development of agglomerations, new housing instruments and investment in vocational education. In this context, regional policy becomes a key mechanism for coordinating demographic, social and economic adaptation.

9. Smart Specialisation and the Economic Reconversion of Regions

Recovery creates a risk of reproducing the pre-war economic structure where it has already lost its competitiveness or physical foundation. New regionalism should

combine reconstruction with economic reconversion. This means moving from the logic of “restore the enterprise or facility as it was” to the question, “what function should this territory perform in the new economy of Ukraine and the EU?” For old-industrial regions, this may mean decarbonisation, engineering and defence diversification, new energy and materials; for agricultural regions, processing, the bioeconomy and logistics integration; and for university centres, technology clusters, R&D and innovation services.

Smart specialisation is valuable precisely because it restrains the administrative temptation to designate everything as a priority at once. A regional strategy should be evidence-based, drawing on the structure of exports, employment, value chains, patent and research activity, enterprise capabilities, the presence of suppliers, logistics, access to energy and the potential for integration into European production networks. Public investment should be concentrated where there is a critical mass of assets and a realistic pathway towards greater technological sophistication—not where an industry merely reflects a nationwide policy fashion.

The entrepreneurial discovery process is of particular importance. After the war, the state will not have enough information to identify all promising specialisations centrally. Businesses have a better view of markets and technological niches; universities understand scientific capabilities; communities see spatial constraints; and the state defines strategic and security priorities. Their systematic interaction should be embedded in the regular review cycle of regional programmes. This also creates a mechanism for abandoning ineffective priorities: smart specialisation should be a process of discovery and adjustment, not a once-and-for-all approved list of sectors.

In practical terms, regional programmes should be linked to sets of missions. Examples include “decarbonising an industrial hub”, “moving from raw-material exports to food processing”, “technological reconversion of defence capabilities into dual-use technologies”, and “integrating a border region into European supply chains”. Each mission should have a limited number of measurable outcomes, clearly defined beneficiaries, a financial framework and a mechanism for terminating support if the expected outcomes are not achieved.

Discussion

The proposed approach partly extends the place-based tradition of Barca, McCann and Rodríguez-Pose (2012), but under Ukrainian conditions it requires a substantial security dimension. In classical European policy, territorial heterogeneity is associated primarily with productivity, accessibility, demography and institutional quality. In Ukraine, these factors are compounded by the risk of physical destruction of assets, disruption of logistics and forced migration. Equal territorial opportunities therefore require asymmetric instruments.

The approach is also consistent with the findings of Rodríguez-Pose and Garcilazo (2015) on the importance of governance quality. The scale of future resources for Ukraine creates a temptation to treat financing as the principal constraint. In reality, the constraint may be the capacity to prepare, select, implement and verify a sufficient number of high-quality investments. This makes expenditure on the civil service, data, project preparation, audit and evaluation a productive investment rather than an administrative “overhead”.

At the same time, new regionalism should not become an ideology of maximum decentralisation. The experience of EU countries shows that the regionalisation of programmes works only within a framework of stringent rules, a unified control system and a significant role for central government in ensuring the macro-financial

and legal framework. For Ukraine, the optimal model is subsidiarity, under which a decision is taken at the lowest level capable of bearing full responsibility for its quality.

A separate issue for discussion is the relationship between reconstruction and development. Rebuilding a destroyed facility does not in itself guarantee the restoration of a territory's economic function. In regions experiencing deep depopulation, changed logistics flows or the structural loss of basic industries, mechanical reconstruction of the pre-war network may entrench an inefficient spatial structure. The build back better principle should therefore be complemented by a build back differently principle where the economic geography itself has changed.

Practical Proposals for the Transition to the New Regionalism Model

Period	Key Decision	Expected Outcome
2026–2027	National territorial typology; accreditation of regional bodies; centres of competence; Chapter 22 staff training.	Institutional readiness for programme management and a narrower capacity gap between regions.
2026–2027	Pilot integrated territorial programmes for five to seven types of territories using Ukraine Facility resources.	Testing multiannual programming instead of competitions among individual facilities.
2027–2028	Project Preparation Facility for communities and regions.	High-quality feasibility studies, cost-benefit analyses, environmental assessments and procurement packages.
2028–2030	Launch of regional programmes for 2028–2034 and a national co-financing fund.	Compatibility with the future EU financial framework and a transition to performance-based financing.
After 2030	Scaling up the system in line with Ukraine's negotiating status and the available EU instruments.	Transition from donor-led recovery to standard European Cohesion Policy.

Conclusions

Ukraine's regional policy should move from a logic of distributing resources among territories to a logic of development through territories. European integration should not mean mechanically copying the institutions of a particular EU Member State. Its substance lies in adopting the principles of programming, partnership, multi-level governance, accountability, audit and outcome evaluation.

The proposed “5Ps of new regionalism” model—place, potential, partnership, powers and cohesion policy—provides the conceptual framework for this transformation. Place defines the functional unit of policy; potential, its economic content; partnership, the mechanism for shaping decisions; powers, the institutional locus of responsibility; and cohesion policy, the financial and regulatory framework that links funding to outcomes.

Five key steps are required for practical implementation: introduce a national territorial typology; move to multiannual regional programmes; professionalise and accredit regional development agencies; transform the national regional development fund into an instrument for programme co-financing; and create an outcome framework in which the principal criterion is not the absorption of funds but changes in productivity, demographic resilience, access to services, private investment and institutional quality.

In this sense, new regionalism is not another administrative reform. It is a new model of national development in which a strong state and strong regions do not contradict one another, but form a shared system of responsibility for territorial

transformation. This model should become the conceptual foundation of the State Strategy for Regional Development for 2028–2034.

Prospects for Further Research

Further research should focus on the quantitative operationalisation of the proposed territorial typology; the development of an index of regional institutional capacity for accrediting managing and intermediate bodies; modelling the formula for national co-financing of regional programmes; and assessing the impact of different combinations of grants, loans and guarantees on private investment. The spatial restructuring of the settlement system and productive forces after the war also requires separate analysis, including the question of when the pre-war infrastructure network should be restored and when a new functional geography should be created.

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Данилишин Б. М. Новий регіоналізм: як має розвиватися регіональна політика України крізь призму євроінтеграції

Мета. Обґрунтувати концептуальні засади нового регіоналізму для України в умовах війни, післявоєнної відбудови та європейської інтеграції й сформувати інституційно-фінансову модель переходу від переважно розподільчої політики бюджетного вирівнювання до територіально орієнтованої політики розвитку, сумісної з принципами політики згуртованості ЄС.

Методологія. Застосовано системний, інституційний і порівняльний підходи, метод case study для аналізу досвіду Польщі, Румунії та Хорватії. Інформаційну базу становлять нормативно-правові акти ЄС та України,

матеріали Європейської комісії, RDNA5, документи Ukraine Facility та наукові праці з проблематики *place-based development*, *Cohesion Policy* і *smart specialisation*.

Результати. Обґрунтовано необхідність переходу від політики розподілу ресурсів між адміністративними одиницями до розвитку функціональних територій з урахуванням їхнього потенціалу, безпекових ризиків, демографічних змін та інституційної спроможності. Запропоновано модель «5П нового регіоналізму»: простір, потенціал, партнерство, повноваження, політика згуртованості. Визначено напрями її реалізації: формування національної територіальної типології, запровадження багаторічних регіональних програм, професіоналізація агенцій регіонального розвитку, поєднання грантів, кредитів і гарантій, розвиток *smart specialisation* та перехід від оцінювання освоєння коштів до системи економічних, соціально-демографічних та інституційних результатів.

Оригінальність. Розвинуто *place-based* підхід шляхом його адаптації до безпечно асиметричної економіки України, в якій територіальні диспропорції визначаються не лише продуктивністю та якістю інституцій, а й ризиками руйнування активів, вимушеною міграцією та трансформацією логістичних зв'язків. Обґрунтовано принцип асиметричної децентралізації, за яким обсяг делегованих функцій залежить від доведеної інституційної спроможності регіональних структур.

Практична цінність. Запропонований підхід може бути використаний для формування Державної стратегії регіонального розвитку України на 2028-2034 роки, розроблення територіально диференційованих програм відновлення та підготовки інституційної системи України до імплементації вимог Розділу 22 *acquis* ЄС.

Ключові слова: регіональна політика, новий регіоналізм, політика згуртованості ЄС, територіально орієнтований розвиток, багаторівневе врядування, *smart specialisation*, відбудова України, європейська інтеграція.

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